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ABSTRACT
Online media offers opportunities to marketers to deliver
brand messages to a large audience. Advertising technology
platforms enables the advertisers to find the proper group of
audiences and deliver ad impressions to them in real time.
The recent growth of the real time bidding has posed a sig-
nificant challenge on monitoring such a complicated system.
With so many components we need a reliable system that
detects the possible changes in the system and alerts the
engineering team. In this paper we describe the mechanism
that we invented for recovering the representative metrics
and detecting the change in their behavior. We show that
this mechanism is able to detect the possible problems in
time by describing some incident cases.
CCS Concepts
•Information systems→ Computational advertising;
Keywords
Anomaly detection, Change point detection, Computational
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1. INTRODUCTION
Online advertising has enabled the marketers to engage
with the proper audiences in real time. This has resulted in
exponential growth of online advertising and, in particular,
real time bidding [10]. The real time bidding platforms are
complicated systems with many moving parts. Such plat-
forms, typically, are highly distributed with low latency re-
quirements. They offer variety of targeting and biding op-
tions and have diverse set of clients with radically different
requirements, goals and budgets. The simple implication of
such a heterogeneous environment is that, the likelihood of
failure is not negligible. In other words, there is always a
module, third party data or incoming traffic that can change
and result in an abrupt and unexpected behavior of the sys-
tem that can affect the entire set of advertisers, or just a
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group of advertising campaigns.
In order to monitor the health of the system, we, at Turn,
have thousands of metrics that are monitored by various
mechanisms. Many of such monitoring systems, rely on
some anomaly detection algorithm. There has been a sig-
nificant research work on anomaly detection. Refer to [3, 4]
for comprehensive surveys on many anomaly detection algo-
rithms and their applications. More recent works, such as
[6], mainly focus on post processing techniques that reduce
the false alarms and increase the quality of an anomaly de-
tection task.Depending on the nature of the metric and its
limitations, such as availability of labels, historical data, etc.
, one needs to decide to choose from variety of algorithms
and processing techniques.
An important class of metrics is the final performance
indicators. In advertising, these indicators include cam-
paign’s spending, number of submitted ad impressions, click
through rate (CTR), conversion rate (CVR), etc. These
metrics are the most interesting indicators for the advertis-
ers. However, they are difficult to monitor since they are
dependent on the incoming traffic, system performance and
even the campaign setup, such as budget, audience targeting
criteria, etc.
We pose the monitoring of the final campaign performance
metrics as a contextual anomaly detection problem [3]. We
show that by clustering the relevant campaigns and select-
ing an appropriate representative for each cluster and other
computational techniques, one can use a standard, and yet
robust, anomaly detection algorithm to achieve a superior
monitoring system. The contributions of this papers are:
• Enumerating and explaining the requirements and chal-
lenges of imposing a monitoring system on campaign
performance metrics.
• Proposing a method, based on correlation and statisti-
cal testing for representing the clusters of similar cam-
paigns.
• Presenting a comprehensive system for real time mon-
itoring and alerting on final campaign performance
metrics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In § 2 we
present some background on demand side platforms and its
monitoring requirements. The detail of the system design
and methodology is presented in § 3. The evaluation of the
the proposed system is presented in § 4 and the paper is
concluded by § 5.
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Figure 1: The schematic design of a typical demand
side platform.
2. BACKGROUND
A demand side platform (DSP), manages marketing cam-
paigns of several advertisers simultaneously by identifying
the target audience matching the campaign requirements
and making real time bidding decisions on behalf of the
advertisers to purchase ad impressions at the ‘best’ price.
Therefore, many advertisers have been compelled to use
DSPs to deliver their branding messages to the right au-
dience at scale. On the other hand, more users around
the world are using the Internet to access the information
on daily basis. Consequently, more advertising budgets to-
gether with more incoming traffic, have posed a great chal-
lenge on DSPs to scale and maintain the quality of service.
In this section, we briefly describe the relevant background
on the general design of a DSP and the overall monitoring
system to set the stage for our proposed framework.
2.1 Demand Side Platform
Figure 1 depicts the overall architecture of a demand side
platform. The exchange (or the supply side platform) sub-
mits a bid request that describes the inventory by specifying
the URL, position of the ad, acceptable ad format, ect., and,
if available, a user ID. The request is received by the presen-
tation server, where it is decoded and augmented by a user
profile that is extracted from a profile server, based on the
provided user ID. This decoded message, sometimes called
an adCall, is then submitted to an ad server. Ad server,
receives the adCall, the set of ads and their budget, and
determines the set of ads that are qualified to bid for the
inventory. For each qualified ad, a bid is estimated that
quantifies the value of the inventory to the advertiser for
that specific ad. For instance, if the advertiser value a click
at 2$ and the the bid estimation algorithm estimates that
the probability of the click is 1%, then the bid price for this
ad, inventory and user is 0.02$. Refer to [7, 8], for more
detail on bid prediction and model evaluation.
After producing a bid for each one of the qualified ads, the
ad server submits back the ad that has the highest estimated
bid price, to the presentation server, which, after encoding,
sends this information back to the exchange. The ad ex-
change platform, conduct an auction to identify the winner
ad submitted by multiple DPS. If the submitted ad wins the
auction, the DSP will be notified to serve the corresponding
ad impression. This entire process needs to be completed
within at most 100 millisecond including the network delay.
An important component in the above work flow, is a ser-
vice that we call the control server. Control server maintains
the real time budget of each campaign, the number of im-
pressions, the spending, clicks and conversion attributed to
each campaign. The main duty of the control server is to al-
locate [5] and pace [9] the budget of each campaign through
its lifetime. Therefore, in contrast to other services, the con-
trol server is a singleton. The ad serving services, namely
presentation, profile and ad servers, are highly distributed
services. Therefore, a centralized service, i.e. the control
server, is required to gather the information, specially, about
the spending and remaining budget. This property gives
the control server a unique position as the source of truth.
Therefore, our anomaly detection mechanism is deployed in
the control server.
2.2 Monitoring
Having a highly complicated and distributed architecture,
a DSP is prone to falter at any time. There are generally
two sources of failure: i)internal and ii) external.
Internal: A bug in the most recent release is probably the
most common internal issue. Despite comprehensive testing,
it is still possible that a faulty code is deployed in the pro-
duction. This can cause immediate crashes in the system or,
it might cause only a set of campaigns to perform slightly
worse.
External: A DSP is dependent on its exchange partners.
If they fail to provide a robust and reliable traffic, the per-
formance of a DSP can be greatly affected. Also, many
advertisers would like to use third-party or first-party data.
For instance, an advertiser might need to use its own mar-
keting data for targeting the correct audience. In that case,
the DSP needs to ingest that data and use them during the
ad serving. Another example is when an advertiser wants
to use a mechanism offered by a third-party provider for
filtering the web sites that its ads are served to. A failure
on part of a data provider can cause the system to behave
abnormally, despite the fact that all internal systems are
performing as expected.
There is also, more sensitive services, such as fraud de-
tection for which, one might want to use a combination of
external and internal solutions.
One needs to impose monitoring systems on all the rel-
evant metrics from incoming traffic to messages passed be-
tween the services and the internal health of each service
such as its memory and CPU usage (per machine). It is
evident that there are thousands of metrics that need to be
monitored.
A set of important metrics that represent the health of
system and needs to be watched closely is the final output
of the system. That is, the ad serving and the possible
outcomes, i.e. clicks and conversions. Actually, as long as
the campaigns are serving ads and spend their budget and
observe clicks and conversions at a stable pace, there is no
urgent problem. Essentially, if for instance, an exchange
partner fails but majority of the campaigns are able to switch
their ad serving to another exchange, the urgency of the issue
is much less than a failure that stops some campaigns from
spending their budget.
Therefore, our focus in this paper is to impose a reliable
and robust monitoring system on the final output of the
system, which is campaign spending and performance.
2.3 Goals
The goal of our anomaly detection system is to issue an
alert about once the DSP is not functioning as expected, in
a timely manner so the engineers could investigate and fix
the issues before considerable damage is caused.
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Figure 2: The Campaign Monitoring and Anomaly
Detection Workflow.
• The metric itself, must be as informative as possible.
That is, once the alert is initiated, we must have a
quick way to isolate the cause of malfunctioning.
• The alert should have a reasonably high precision. As
we mentioned earlier, the alerts that are generated on
the final campaign performance metrics are considered
as a high priority and thus, it is important that we
employ a reliable and precise mechanism for initiating
them. We do not want to miss an incident either and
therefore, we require the detection algorithm to posses
a reasonable discovery rate as well. In fact we would
prefer a to have a few false alarms in the interest of a
higher discovery rate.
• The alerts should be triggered within reasonable amount
of time, typically a couple of hours since the onset of
an incident.
The latency requirement poses a challenge on the control
server. To attain a holistic view of the campaign perfor-
mance, the anomaly detection system collects data from
all campaigns, which imposes overhead to several latency-
sensitive core components in the DSP, such as budget pac-
ing and data collection. As a result we need to minimize
the performance impact by running the detection system
less frequently and hence tolerate longer failure-to-detection
latencies.
3. DESIGN
Millions of metrics are being generated constantly for all
the campaigns running on Turn’s platform, every one of
which needs to be monitored and analyzed in real time to
identify anomalous behaviors since system issues can occur
at any part of the platform. The overhead could easily bring
the platform to its knees especially so considering the sub-
100-millisecond latency requirement imposed on bidding by
ad exchanges. In this section, we present the design of our
anomaly detection system which sieves through millions of
metrics efficiently to find abnormal behaviors within a rea-
sonable amount of time. The key idea of our design is to
apply filtering and aggregation to the metrics before run-
ning the anomaly detection algorithm against the resulting
data of a much smaller amount.
As illustrated by Figure 2, the workflow of the anomaly
detection system consists of four steps: (a) identifying stable
campaigns by looking at campaign setup and behavior cor-
relation; (b) aggregating the metrics over clusters of stable
campaigns; (c) generating and storing time series from the
aggregated metrics; (d) detecting anomalies using a simple
algorithm designed to identify under-performing metrics. As
described in Section 1, the control server, as a centralized
service that maintains all campaign performance metrics, is
the most suitable place to implement the anomaly detection
Table 1: Stability Checks for Campaign Setup
Name Requirement
Currency US Dollar
Status Active
Duration > p Days
Figure 3: Seasonal Patterns in a Performance Met-
ric.
system. The first two steps, stable campaign identification
and metric aggregation are running on the control server.
Time series data is submitted from a dedicated reporter
thread running on the control server and stored in a dis-
tributed time series database. Finally, the anomaly detector
is deployed as a separate service that ingest time series from
the database to find anomalies and alert for system issues.
3.1 Stable Campaign Identification
Let Sstable denote the set of stable campaings. Given a
metric, we scan all campaigns periodically and select the
appropriate ones to include in (or exclude from) Sstable. Par-
ticularly, all campaigns are included Sstable in the beginning,
which is then prune through a two-step process detailed in
the section. The selection of stable campaigns are refreshed
every hour and cached in the memory by the control server.
3.1.1 Campaign Setup
During the first step, the configurations of all campaigns
are checked against a set of pre-defined rules presented Ta-
ble 1. The campaigns that fail any of these tests in Table 1
are removed from Sstable. The check list is determined pri-
marily based on our experience in tuning numerous cam-
paigns.
The anomaly detection system considers only US dollar
based campaigns because the campaigns the number of cam-
paigns that run on this currency represent a sufficiently large
portion of the system. Furthermore, mixing the currencies
will add to the already significant noise that the system
carries. Note that the intention of this system is to catch
system-wide failures and not campaign specific problems.
Furthermore, we only consider active campaigns to monitor
the current status of the platform. Therefore the campaigns
paused by advertisers or stopped due to budget exhaustion
are also excluded from Sstable. On the other hand, we also
avoid the campaigns started a short period ago since there
is not much data for us to analyze when the campaigns are
still in the optimization mode.
3.1.2 Traffic Seasonality
Now Sstable contains only campaigns that have passed all
the stability checks for campaign setup mentioned above.
However, a stable campaign setup itself does not guaran-
tee a stable performance since the incoming traffic qualified
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Figure 4: Identify stable campaigns using week-
over-week behavior correlations.
for a given campaign can vary over the time and make the
campaign performance difficult to predict. Figure 3 illus-
trates the seasonal behaviors over the hour of the day and
the day of the week of a performance metric due to traffic
seasonality.
To exclude the impact from traffic fluctuation, we compare
the behavior of a campaign between two moving windows w1
and w2, each of l hours long, dispersed by a p-day period, to
determine if the campaign preserves the same behavior over
w1 and w2 albeit the traffic patterns. Other things being
equal, w1 and w2 should behavior similarly if an l-hour-long
pattern repeats every p days in the volume of the traffic. For
the sake of simplicity, we apply l = 24 and p = 1, 7 in our
system to capture daily and weekly patterns in the traffic.
The proper values for l and p can be learned from the time
series itself using statistical modeling techniques, which we
leave for future exploration.
To quantify the behavior similarity between w1 and w2,
we track the performance metric over the two time windows
and discretize the curve into two vectors v1 and v2 that con-
sist of hourly aggregated values for w1 and w2, respectively.
Let Cw1,w2,l,p denote the correlation of v1 and v2. We use
Cw1,w2,l,p as the measure of behavior similarity between w1
and w2. Furthermore, campaigns in Sstable is filtered using
Cw1,w2,l,p and a constant 0 < δ < 1 by this inequality:
Cw1,w2,l,p > δ (1)
Since the current hour may exhibit anomalous behavior
due to unforeseeable system issues, we introduce a delay of
x hours between the end hour of w1, w2 and the current
hour. Essentially, as long as a campaign performs stably till
x hours ago, the campaign would be considered to have a
correlated behavior by our system.
3.2 Change Metric Generation
Starting from the set of stable campaigns Sstable, we split
the stable campaigns into clusters and aggregate the raw
metrics in each cluster. Metric aggregation is performed
over selected clusters of campaigns such that the anomaly
detection system can cover different parts of the platform
through monitoring the aggregated metrics. Campaigns are
clustered according to the criteria used for targeted adver-
tising or the media channels where the ads are served. Be-
cause our code base is constructed in a way that each tar-
geting criterion or media channel is handled by a relatively
self-sufficient module, we can easily pinpoint an issue in the
platform according to the aggregated metrics that manifest
the issue. The anomaly detection system considers the most
common targeting criteria as listed in Table 2 and four ma-
jor media channels, namely display, video, mobile and social
networks when clustering the campaigns.
Downsampling is then performed on the aggregated time
Table 2: Metric Aggregation based on Targeting
Criteria of Campaigns
Name Target
Demographic Users of particular demographic
traits, such as age and gender.
Contextual Content category, page quality,
brand safety, etc.
Behavioral Users that satisfy certain behav-
ioral rules, e.g. having visited the
advertiser’s site before.
Dayparting Particular time periods in a day.
Device Particular types of devices, such
PC, iOS, Android, etc.
Site List Including or excluding a list of sites.
series to reduce to one data point per hour by summing up all
data points within every hour. In doing so we preserve suffi-
cient information for detecting anomalous behaviors within
a couple of hours while avoiding the overhead that would in-
cur if the original time series were transferred and analyzed.
The sampled time series is transformed into a differential se-
ries by taking the difference of the metric between each pair
of data points whose timestamps differ by p days. We call
the hourly differential time series change metric to distin-
guish from the raw performance metric. The change metric
is the final form of the data which is then stored in the time
series database.
3.3 Time Series Storage
Time series are generated on the control server and then
submitted to OpenTSDB [2], a distributed time series database
built on top of HBase [1]. OpenTSDB serves the persistence
layer for the time series data and the feed for the anomaly
detector.
Each sample in the time series consists of the timestamp
when the entry is submitted, the value of the metric and a
list of tags. The timestamps are written with second res-
olution. In case of duplicated data points for the same
timestamp, the most recent value is recorded. Tags are a
set of optional key-value pairs associated with the time se-
ries to provide additional information about the aggregation.
Samples of the time series are taken periodically by the ded-
icated reporter thread on the control server and submitted
to OpenTSDB through HTTP messages. A message begins
with the operation name, followed by the metric name, the
timestamp and the metric value, finally ends with the list of
tags, as illustrated by the example below:
put proc.net.tcp.connections 1417642359 2
remote_host =50.116.234.5 direction=in
state=established domain=sjc2 host=app454
The reporter thread collects data for the lightweight metrics
in real time and reads the resource-intensive metrics from a
cache refreshed less frequently by the control server to pre-
vent performance degradation in the mission-critical parts of
the control server, such as budget enforcement which deals
with money.
OpenTSDB is deployed in a dedicated cluster to provide a
scalable and reliable store for the enormous amount of time
series data generated by thousands of machines in our pro-
duction system. Upon the arrival of each sample, it performs
compression to generate more compacted data that is faster
to query and more suitable for dashboards and graphs span-
ning more than a few hours of data. OpenTSDB provides
a convenient user interface for querying and visualizing the
stored time series. It also supplies a set of HTTP APIs that
enable querying, inserting and deleting the data in batches.
Our anomaly detector is one of the consumers of the time
series data stored in the OpenTSDB cluster and employs the
batch APIs to fetch the data set to analyze.
3.4 Anomaly Detection
In this subsection, we describe our standard anomaly de-
tection algorithm applied onto the change metric defined in
Section 3.2. The algorithm is presented in Table 1. We as-
sume a Gaussian distribution, N(µ, σ), on the input time
series, that is dt, ∀t. Essentially, the algorithm denotes a di
as anomalous if |di − µ| > βσ where 0 ≤ β ≤ 3 is a parame-
ter that depends on the discovered anomalies. To make the
algorithms more robust, one needs to limit its memory. To
accomplish this, we use a decaying factor, namely 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
to smoothly discount the past during the calculation of run-
ning sum of time points. Therefore, the algorithm can easily
be applied to any time-series and requires us to keep only
three variables in the memory.
Algorithm 1: Anomaly detection algorithm
Input
dt
Initialization
X ,X 2, n
while dt is valid do
µ = X
n
,σ =
√
X2
n
− (X
n
)2
if |dt − µ| > βσ then
if dt < 0 then
at = Anomaly
shrink(β)
end if
else
X = αX + dt
X 2 = αX 2 + d2t
n = αn+ 1
end if
end while
The initialization phase of the algorithm takes a small ini-
tial part of the time series as the training data and estimates
the values for X ,X 2, n based on the training data which is
assumed anomaly-free. In the main loop of the algorithm,
X ,X 2, n are updated for every data points falling within the
µ ± βσ range. Note only the negative outliers are deemed
true anomalies and decrease the range of normal data points
by shrinking β, the rest including both normal data points
and positive outliers are considered normal by the algorithm.
The focus of our work is on detecting anomalies when they
indicate a negative change. While a positive change can be
anomalous as well, they are controlled and detected by other
systems. For instance, if we start receiving abnormally large
number of clicks, then our fraud detection modules start
to investigate the issue. Therefore, our system follows an
asymmetric design that focuses on under-performing. Also,
a sudden jump is system’s performance metrics is expected
when an issue is resolved. We use β as the shrinkage for
the normal range and diminish the range proportionally ac-
cording to the percentage of anomalies detected in a moving
window. Denote Nnormal the number of normal points in
the window and Nabnormal the number of anomalies. Then
β is updated in function shrink(β) as follows:
β = 3 · Nnormal
Nnormal +Nabnormal
(2)
4. EVALUATION
This section presents our experience applying the anomaly
detection system to a real performance metric during a pe-
riod in which four incidents were discovered by the tool.
Two of the issues were transient and resolved by themselves.
The other two issues were caused by program errors. Three
of the incidents lasted for less than a day, while the last
one got fixed a week after its inception. Our tool success-
fully detected all four issues and demonstrated its robustness
against both short-living and long-lasting issues. The final
change metric retrieved by the anomaly detector consists
of 2185 data points, out of which 160 points are anoma-
lous as they concur with system issues in time. One week
worth of data is used as the training data to initialize the
anomaly detection algorithm and the rest of the data is used
to evaluate the performance of the system. Note we omit the
numbers and exact timestamps associated with the metrics
in the results presented here to comply with the company’s
regulations.
4.1 Metric Stability
We compare the metrics obtained from all campaigns run-
ning on Turn’s platform and those including only stable cam-
paigns. The day-over-day change metrics (i.e. p = 1) in Fig-
ure 6(b) is evidently more informative than the all-campaign
metric in Figure 6(a) regarding the occurrences of system is-
sues. The week-over-week change metrics (i.e. p = 7) in Fig-
ure 7(b) shows a highly stabilized behavior which leaves the
negative spikes caused by system issues apparent to identify.
On the contrary, the week-over-week all-campaign metric in
Figure 7(a) reveals little information about system health as
it is contaminated by strong noise. In our final configuration
of the anomaly detection system, we use the week-over-week
metric in Figure 7(b) as the input to the detector.
4.2 Accuracy
We also evaluate the accuracy of the anomaly detection
system using the same data set described above. The week-
over-week change metric derived from the original time se-
ries is used for the numbers presented here. We employ the
standard F1 measure defined in Equation 3 to quantify the
accuracy of the anomaly detection system. In Equation 3,
precision denotes the ratio of true anomalies among all de-
tected data points, and recall the percentage of anomalies
that are detected.
F1 -Score = 2 · Precision ·Recall
Precision+Recall
(3)
Figure 5 illustrates the result of the experiment: 157 true
anomalies and 12 false positives are identified and 3 anoma-
lies missed. The system has a precision of 92.9% and a recall
of 98.1%. The F1 measure is 0.954 based on the precision
and the recall. The false positives are mostly borderline
cases which overlay or slightly exceed the lower bound for
anomaly detection, while all of the missed anomalies locate
Figure 5: The anomaly detection algorithm is applied to a real performance metric collected over three
months. Red boxes highlight the periods in which the incidents occurred. Green diamonds are the data points
flagged as anomalous by our tool. The upper and lower bounds are determined by µ± βσ in Algorithm 1.
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(a) A day-over-day metric that includes all campaigns.
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(b) Day-over-day change metrics that include only stable
campaigns.
Figure 6: The daily metrics are unstable in general
due to traffic fluctuation during the course of the
week, and difficult to correlate with the occurrence
of system issues.
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(a) A week-over-week metric that includes all campaigns.
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(b) Week-over-week change metrics that include only stable
campaigns.
Figure 7: The weekly metrics from stable campaigns
are highly correlated with prior system issues.
close to the beginning of incidents when it is difficult to
discern between normal and abnormal behaviors based on
metrics.
5. CONCLUSION
We present an anomaly detection system that identifies
system issues based on self-correlated behavior of stable cam-
paigns in a large-scale DSP. The system has been deployed
in our production cluster and successfully detected several
major system problems which otherwise would not be dis-
covered until severe consequences are caused.
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